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“Good politics is good government”: The
Troubling History of Mayoral Control of the
Public Schools in Twentieth-Century Chicago
JIM CARL
Cleveland State University
This article looks at urban education through the vantage point of Chicago’s
mayors. It begins with Carter H. Harrison II (who served from 1897 to 1905
and again from 1911 to 1915) and ends with Richard M. Daley (1989 to the
present), with most of the focus on four long-serving mayors: William Hale
Thompson (1915–23 and 1927–31), Edward Kelly (1933–47), Richard J. Daley
(1955–76), and Harold Washington (1983–87). Mayors exercised significant lev-
erage in the Chicago Public Schools throughout the twentieth century, making
the history of Chicago mayors’ educational politics relevant to the contemporary
trend in urban education to give more control to mayors in hopes that it leads
to improved educational attainment and achievement. A look backward to may-
oral politics in Chicago suggests that mayoral control is no panacea for urban
education: mayors used strategies of patronage and professionalism to maintain
political power, and this eclipsed motivations to improve the schools in an ed-
ucational sense, in spite of recurrent calls for better schools from the civil rights
movement, middle-class reformers, and business interests.
In 1995 Mayor Richard M. Daley gained sweeping control of public education
in Chicago. Illinois Governor Jim Edgar signed a Republican-drafted bill that
allowed the Democratic mayor to select a “chief executive officer” for the
schools and appoint a powerful five-member board of education (Bradley 1995;
Harp 1995). The 1995 Chicago School Reform Act raised the visibility of
mayoral control of public education nationally as mayors in other cities also
gained greater authority in school governance, most notably Boston in 1992,
Detroit in 1999, Washington, DC, in 2000, and New York in 2003 (Henig
and Rich 2004).1 Mayor Daley’s and others’ new-found authority in school
affairs does not mesh with a long-standing trend in the history of big city
school systems, the transfer of control, since the Progressive era, from poli-
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ticians to business elites and professional experts (Hogan 1985; Tyack 1974;
Wrigley 1982). “In a strange reversal,” notes sociologist Katherine Neckerman,
“city and state politicians have cast themselves in the same role progressive
reformers claimed a century ago, seeking to purge the city schools of waste
and corruption and run them according to sound business principles” (2000,
135).
Richard M. Daley, however, was not the first Chicago mayor to be cast in
this role. Precedent for the 1995 legislation harkens back nearly a century,
when Mayor Carter H. Harrison II appointed an education commission with
William Rainey Harper, president of the University of Chicago as well as
president of the Chicago Board of Education, as chair (Kantowicz 2005;
Murphy 1990). The Harper Report, which recommended a mayor-appointed
board with a much-reduced membership (Educational Commission 1900;
Wrigley 1982), served as the archetype for all subsequent “social efficiency”
reforms, including the 1995 legislation. Harper’s appointment enabled Mayor
Harrison to be linked to expert reform, much like the 1995 legislation enabled
Mayor Daley to be cast as the efficient administrator bringing order to a
decentralized system. The 1995 reform, then, represents not so much a break
with the past as an extension of long-standing mayoral authority in the schools.
If anything, a break with mayoral control occurred in 1988, when legislation
removed most appointive authority from the mayor’s office and vested it in
a short-lived school board nominating commission that drew the majority of
its membership from elected parents and community residents.
In this article I look at urban school politics through the vantage point of
Chicago’s twentieth-century mayors, asking how mayors influenced the public
schools and to what ends. The assumption that guides this study follows the
suggestion of political scientists Stephen Elkin and Clarence Stone that urban
politics in the United States represents a duality of “popular control of gov-
ernmental authority and private ownership of business activity” (Elkin 1987;
Stone 1989, 9). Stone goes on to remind us, though, that this commonplace
observation—the reality of democracy and capitalism in urban politics—leaves
room for considerable variety. Since populations, political organizations, and
economic sectors vary in their complexity, “there is no one formula for bringing
institutional sectors into an arrangement for cooperation, and the whole pro-
cess is imbued with uncertainty. Cooperation is always somewhat tenuous,
and it is made more so as conditions change and new actors arise on the
scene” (Stone 1989, 9). In the twentieth century, business interests played a
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pivotal and dynamic role in the governance of Chicago’s schools, a position
that has been demonstrated by Dorothy Shipps in School Reform, Corporate Style
(2006). I concentrate on popular control through the vantage point of the
mayor’s office, for in the electoral efforts of local politicians who “need to put
together coalitions of diverse interests,” Elkin argues that “the most important
of these elected officials are mayors, in terms of both the powers that they
wield and the visibility of their activities” (1987, 34).
Since the 1990s advocates have pushed for mayoral control in big cities for
several reasons, not the least among them being accountability: “Voters need
to be able to hire and fire one person accountable to parents, teachers, and
taxpayers,” according to Los Angeles Mayor Antonio R. Villaraigosa (Editors
2006, 141). Others reason that the prestige and power of the mayor’s office
ideally position mayors to harness reform coalitions that move through the
political gridlock of elected school boards to generate education policies that
raise academic achievement. Whereas urban mayors “may be the only public
officials with the clout and visibility needed to promote significant changes,”
according to Jennifer Hochschild and Nathan Scovronick, they “often have
little or no control over their school districts” (2003, 84). Some even claim
that mayoral control of the schools will generate economic development as
greater numbers of middle-class parents send their children to improved public
schools and as increased academic achievement translates into a more pro-
ductive labor force (Kirst 2002). Mayors, according to advocates of strong
mayoral control of urban education, have the potential to organize disparate
social groups into citywide coalitions to effect lasting improvements in
education.
Recent scholarship on the politics of urban education that utilizes a “civic
capacity” framework also tacitly endorses increased mayoral authority. Civic
capacity refers to a threshold of cooperation among political, economic, and
civil actors necessary for school politics to rise to the level of comprehensive
school reform. Scholars note that social and spatial reforms seem to come
easier for leaders in some cities than others. “That they can do so,” according
to Jeffrey Henig and his colleagues, “in spite of centrifugal forces and limited
formal powers appears attributable to their success in weaving together formal
and informal sources of power” (1999, 16). While it is clear that most big
cities in the postwar era, especially those located in the Midwest and the
Northeast, face common economic and political challenges that militate against
improved schools, such as suburbanization, deindustrialization, and declining
influence at state and federal levels, there are nevertheless differences in school
reform efforts that seem attributable to variations in the civic capacity of local
political formations. The relative lack of significant education reform in At-
lanta, Baltimore, Detroit, and Washington, DC, prior to the 1990s might
reflect limited civic capacity, for example, whereas coalitions that vested may-
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oral control in Boston and elsewhere since 1992 might be indicative of height-
ened civic capacity (Henig et al. 1999; Henig and Rich 2004). Leaving aside
for now the assumption in the “civic capacity” literature that politicians, busi-
ness leaders, and civic groups working together will reform the schools ac-
cording to the best interests of urban students, it seems that the one leader
most essential for marshaling civic capacity is the mayor.
Due to a tradition of strong mayoral control, Windy City school reformers—
whether of the business, “good government,” civil rights, or grass roots va-
rieties—all encountered Chicago’s mayors at the top of the school bureaucracy,
even before the reform act of 1995. Whether mayoral control was transparent
or opaque depended upon the political context and the personality of the
mayor, but mayors exercised significant leverage in the public schools through-
out the twentieth century, making the history of Chicago mayors’ relationship
with public education a relevant topic given the contemporary trend in urban
education to “give more control to mayors” in hopes that such a change would
lead to improved school quality (Kirst 2002, 1). Looking backward to the
school politics of Chicago mayors suggests that mayoral control is no panacea
for urban education, however. Even though a central theme in the history of
education literature is the shift in educational governance—from politician to
professional, from amateur to expert, and from backwardness to reform—
Chicago’s mayors occupied both sides of this framework. As mayoral ap-
pointees, school board members and their superintendents often reflected the
patronage and electoral aims of mayoral administrations, but when it suited
their purposes, mayors also embraced the language of social efficiency and
school reform. Yet the strategy of patronage plus professionalism that mayors
employed did not result in an education system characterized by high-quality
schools.
The record of mayoral control prior to 1995 shows that maintaining political
power eclipsed mayoral motivations to improve Chicago’s schools in an ed-
ucational sense, even though educational attainment and achievement of stu-
dents became increasing concerns of middle-class reformers, the civil rights
movement, and business interests as the century wore on. Here I focus on
three mayoralties that Clarence Stone and his colleagues (2001) would depict
as employment regimes, followed by a mayoralty that Dorothy Shipps (2006)
would conceptualize as an empowerment regime. I begin with a mayor best
known for both his demagogic approach to school issues and his use of the
Chicago Public Schools for political spoils—William Hale Thompson, who
served from 1915 to 1923 and again from 1927 to 1931. Thompson controlled
the schools as a populist mayor in a Republican political machine. I then
move to two mayors during the quintessential machine years of the Cook
County Democratic Party Organization—Edward J. Kelly (1933–47) and,
especially, Richard J. Daley (1955–76), the mayor who perhaps most deftly
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straddled the divide between professionalism and patronage. Kelly dealt with
the schools as a Democratic machine partner, whereas Daley managed them
as a Democratic machine boss. To Kelly the schools represented a new pa-
tronage network, while Daley augmented patronage with an image of disin-
terested, professional control. Then I turn to Harold Washington (1983–87),
a mayor who made room for civil rights and grass-roots reformers in school
policy debates dominated by business elites and middle-class reformers. Wash-
ington approached the schools as an anti-machine civil rights Democrat. I
conclude by applying observations on the history of mayoral regimes in Chi-
cago to the contemporary debate over mayoral control.
William Thompson: Populism and Patronage
“Big Bill” Thompson operated as a machine politician whose school politics
was largely symbolic—he used the schools to create controversies that gal-
vanized voters and to absorb patronage once elected. He was politically active
in decades when Chicago party politics was fragmented—both major political
parties competed with each other and with viable third parties in their quests
for electoral and patronage control of Chicago government. In the early twen-
tieth century the Republican Party machine was headed by Fred Lundin, a
Swedish American businessman who drafted Thompson to run for mayor.
For a 16-year period, from 1915 to 1931, “Big Bill” Thompson used populism
and patronage to stand at the top of Republican politics in Chicago, serving
as mayor for 12 of those years. Thompson’s disputes over public school text-
books and the superintendency helped him craft three electoral victories, while
building projects and patronage appointments in an expanding school system
enabled him to reward his business and machine supporters. Thompson used
symbolic politics to create an employment regime that also brought teachers
into its orbit. In the schools, populism and patronage were Thompson’s calling
cards, whereas deeper policies such as educational expansion and greater
effectiveness remained outside of the mayor’s domain.
Mayor Thompson presented the image of a progressive reformer who cul-
tivated the support of business leaders and also that of a populist who cultivated
working-class votes. “Big Bill the Builder” garnered much of his business
support through his completion of large civic projects first promoted in Daniel
Burnham’s business-inspired 1909 Plan of Chicago (Bukowski 1998, 52). In-
deed, the employment that the construction boom generated during the
Thompson years gleaned him electoral support from across the political spec-
trum, while large city contracts probably prevented Chicago’s business or-
ganizations from pressing for a city manager as an alternative to mayoral
control (Weinstein 1962). Throughout his mayoralty, Thompson used his rec-
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ord of support for public works—including expanded school facilities—as a
rejoinder to business groups put off by his bombastic, demagogic missteps.
Moreover, Thompson’s middle- and upper-class appeal was enhanced by a
shared class position with many corporate leaders, especially by his opposition
to labor unions, no small matter in an era of business ascendancy (Hewitt
1922; Wendt and Kogan 1953).
Thompson’s anti-labor position reached a zenith early on in his mayoralty
when he helped take down the Chicago Teachers Federation, led by political
firebrand Margaret Haley. Soon after he took office, Jacob Loeb, a Harrison
appointee to the board, sponsored his famous resolution forbidding teachers
to affiliate with organized labor. Thompson supported Loeb’s rule vigorously.
He argued: “City employees should be prohibited from organizing against the
municipal government” (Bukowski 1998, 46). Through his board appoint-
ments, he elevated Loeb to president. Thompson’s sexism was evident in his
attacks on teachers—he characterized the federation as controlled by “labor
sluggers,” and he also took a swipe at outgoing School Superintendent Ella
Flagg Young, his former teacher, when he claimed that the public schools
“employed too many 75 year olds” (Bukowski 1998, 46). His efforts to reduce
the power of organized teachers also embraced the language of social efficiency.
He persuaded a divided city council to investigate the schools in 1916; the
resulting committee published recommendations for expert business control
of the schools similar to the Harper Report (City Council 1916). By 1917,
one of Harper’s recommendations finally came to fruition when Illinois passed
the “Otis Law,” which reduced board membership from 21 to 11. The Otis
Law enhanced mayoral control in that mayoral appointment of board mem-
bers continued but with new power to borrow against future tax receipts
(Peterson 1985).
Thompson compensated for his business ties by attending to his populist
image—throughout his political career he exploited his early experience as a
western cowboy to glorify rugged individualism and, more importantly, he
modified his popular persona to pursue voting blocs that shifted on the fault
lines of religion, national origin, and gender. In the 1915 election, his anti-
Catholicism was palpable—he accused his Democratic opponent, Mayor Har-
rison, of filling the schools with adherents of the pope (Wendt and Kogan
1953). Not surprisingly, the heavily Catholic Chicago Teachers Federation
came out against him (Herrick 1971; Rousmaniere 2005). But Thompson also
courted immigrant votes, especially Irish and German, through his opposition
to U.S. entry into World War I, which gave his anti-Catholicism less sting.
Once the United States declared war on Germany, Thompson distanced him-
self from the ensuing hostility toward German Americans even as he supported
the war on patriotic grounds—it was the school board that renamed the
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Bismarck School, and it was a student boycott rather than a mayoral decree
that ended German-language instruction (Bukowski 1998).
Patronage remained an overriding concern of Thompson’s mayoralty, how-
ever, and this too caused shifting alliances. Thompson and Loeb parted ways
when the mayor used the Otis Law to stack the board with his business
associates, who used their posts to enrich themselves. Members of the old
school board sought refuge in the courts, and for two years Chicago had
essentially two school boards vying for control, even to the extent of naming
two superintendents in 1919—Charles Chadsey, the “administrative progres-
sive” choice of the Harrison board, and Peter Mortenson, Thompson’s insider
selection (Counts 1928; Hazlett 1968). When Thompson “locked Chadsey out
of his office by order of the city police,” Chadsey too turned to the courts
(Rousmaniere 2005, 184–87). All of this proved too much for Loeb. Although
Thompson had appointed him to his new board, Loeb turned on the mayor
by supporting Chadsey and by using the front page of the Chicago Tribune to
condemn Thompson and his political mentor, Fred Lundin (Loeb 1917). The
1919 mayoral election turned, in part, on a crisis over the school superinten-
dency, which Thompson engineered. In spite of the Tribune’s opposition,
Thompson and Mortenson represented public school expansion, a 100 percent
American curriculum, and progress for the Windy City. With four other may-
oral candidates in the general election, Thompson cruised to victory and forced
Chadsey out.
During his second term, Thompson managed a rapprochement with the
grade school teachers. He already shared some common ground with Margaret
Haley due to their mutual opposition to the entry of the United States into
World War I. Moreover, his instincts for political survival after the passage of
the Nineteenth Amendment and the growing Catholic vote lessened his sexism
and anti-Catholicism. He retaliated against hostile Tribune editorials by ques-
tioning the paper’s sweetheart leases of board-owned real estate, Haley’s de-
fining issue (Beck 1953). Superintendent Mortenson reestablished teacher
councils at most schools in 1921, a practice first proposed by Haley’s Chicago
Teachers Federation and instituted by Superintendent Young. Most impor-
tantly, teacher salaries rose 60 percent under the Thompson-controlled board
(Bukowski 1998; Chicago Board of Education 1917). Haley even became a
Thompson supporter—she opposed Mortenson’s removal when reform Mayor
William Dever took office in 1923, and she campaigned for Thompson in the
1927 election (Rousmaniere 2005).
The school scandal that emerged in 1922 proved Big Bill’s undoing. Amid
allegations that Thompson’s boards had been plundering the schools since
1917, the mayor withdrew from the election the day before Grand Jury in-
dictments of board members and top school officials as well as the patronage
chief, Fred Lundin (Reid 1982). From coverage of the scandal and trial, voters
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learned about padded payrolls, $133 potato peelers, boilers purchased for
nearly three times the list price, School Board President Edwin Davis receiving
a 50 cent cut on each ton of coal the schools burned, and building engineers
kicking back cash for raises (Chicago Daily Tribune 1922; Herrick 1971). Yet the
prosecution’s case was not airtight. Defense attorney Clarence Darrow ob-
tained acquittals for all the major players, although the judge sent two building
engineers to jail for refusing to testify (Counts 1928). They were members of
a department highly susceptible to patronage.
The lack of convictions helped set the stage for Thompson’s rehabilitation.
“Big Bill” asserted that the public school curriculum was dangerously pro-
British, and his isolationist forays into the curriculum reached a demagogic
pitch in the decade after World War I, first as mayor, then as campaigner,
then as mayor again (Bukowski 1987; Zimmerman 2000). He enjoyed quoting
from Washington’s “Farewell Address”: “What was good enough for George
Washington is good enough for Bill Thompson” (Wendt and Kogan 1953,
248). He distributed copies of the Constitution and life histories of Washington
and Lincoln to schoolchildren, proclaimed patriotic exercises for the schools,
and extended adult Americanization programs (Bukowski 1998; Chicago Daily
Tribune 1919). Thompson balanced his reverence for the Founding Fathers
and the Great Emancipator with invitations to immigrants and Blacks to revise
history texts to better reflect their ancestors’ contributions to American civi-
lization. Thompson’s brand of “America first” played well in immigrant neigh-
borhoods and corporate boardrooms alike—the former because federal im-
migration restrictions forced more people to assimilate and the latter because
patriotism seemed a more profitable use of working-class energy than labor
organizing.
But Thompson’s biggest ally in his quest to recapture the mayor’s office
once again turned out to be a hapless school superintendent, this time Dever’s
appointee William McAndrew, whom Thompson lambasted mercilessly in the
1927 campaign. According to Thompson, this “puppet of King George” ap-
proved un-American textbooks that slighted patriots of Irish, German, and
Polish heritage (Wendt and Kogan 1953, 234), whereas Thompson asserted
he would “punch King George in the snoot” (Herrick 1971, 166). In putting
“America first,” the Thompson campaign pledged to appoint “a patriotic
school board . . . who will rid the city of Superintendent William McAndrew,
the Boss Brennan—Mayor Dever’s Eastern importation, and his pro-English
‘yes’ men and women” (Counts 1928, 267–68). Thompson managed to turn
McAndrew into a walking parody of autocratic social efficiency who attracted
the ire of elementary school teachers, organized labor, and working-class par-
ents alike (Reid 1982). Support for McAndrew eroded even as he increased
spending sharply, “making resources available to teachers and pupils to an
extent unprecedented in the city” (Peterson 1985, 158). Among his missteps,
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the priggish superintendent abolished the teachers councils, required grade
school teachers to sign in four times daily, and imposed age limits. He sought
to establish platoon schools on cost-effective grounds, and he began to institute
junior high schools and IQ tests (Bukowski 1998; Counts 1928; Herrick 1971).
McAndrew even handed Thompson a means to signal support to his African
American constituency without antagonizing White Chicago. In 1926 the
Defender complained about anti-Black stereotypes in a high school civics text-
book written by University of Chicago Professor Howard Hill. Assistant Su-
perintendent William Bogan favored removal of the offending passages, but
it was the board of education, not McAndrew, that contacted the publisher
to change the text (Bukowski 1998). Thompson had created a simple edu-
cational formula—“oust Superintendent McAndrew”—that now straddled the
color line.2 For their part, Mayor Dever’s handlers attempted to drive a racial
wedge into Thompson’s Anglophobia: “Bye Bye Blackbird” was sung at 1927
campaign rallies, and a Black man dressed up like Paul Revere rode through
the Loop on horseback, shouting “The British are coming!” to the lunchtime
crowds (Wendt and Kogan 1953, 267). But with a slim 51 percent majority,
Thompson regained the mayor’s office and installed a new board, which fired
McAndrew after five months of farcical hearings and elevated Bogan to the
superintendency (Counts 1928).3
Edward Kelly: Machine Partner in Depression and War
Mayor Edward Kelly was no populist, but under his tenure the schools re-
mained an important source of patronage. In Kelly’s employment regime,
custodians and other workers became fully wedded to a Democratic machine
that excluded teachers. Although Kelly kept a low profile in school politics
during much of his tenure, turbulence at the beginning and end of his may-
oralty exposed his authority and in the end contributed to his undoing. The
Depression and Thompson’s inadequate response guaranteed his 1931 defeat
at the hands of Bohemian-born Anton Cermak, who won in a landslide, having
brought the Democratic machine, dominated largely by Irish American fac-
tions, under his authority (Gottfried 1962). Cermak, known as the “Master
Public Administrator,” inherited a school district in financial collapse, and he
turned to business leaders for help, as they were the only group that could,
in the short run, keep the public schools from shutting down completely.4
Through the Sargent Committee, a business-dominated school task force that
Cermak appointed, he lined up loans in exchange for drastic budget cuts.
The board had already begun constricting the schools in 1931, but its Thomp-
son-appointed majority was unwilling to cut as deeply as the financiers wanted,
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and Cermak was assassinated before full austerity measures could be imple-
mented (Knoth 1987).
His successor Edward Kelly, a bureaucrat with the powerful machine spon-
sorship of Party Chair Patrick Nash, indicated that he would follow Cermak’s
plan for the schools, much to the dismay of teachers and middle-class education
groups who hoped the schools could survive via pay cuts, shortened school years,
and attrition rather than through the massive elimination of programs and jobs
(Knoth 1987).5 For Kelly, however, it was more important to protect the district’s
credit with the banks. By May of 1933 the terms of five board members came
to an end, and Kelly appointed like-minded successors who he said were “close
to the people” and who moved in both business and patronage circles (Hazlett
1968, 19). James McCahey, the head of a coal company, became board president.
The new board made the “economy” cuts that summer, abolishing the junior
high schools, the junior college, and all adult education and vocational guidance
programs. It also curtailed all other programs deemed educational “fads and
frills” (Chicago Board of Education b 1933, 24). Although the board pruned
the law and business departments, educational services bore the brunt of the
retrenchment. Responding to protests over the cuts, Kelly used his board as a
buffer: “See the school board,” the mayor suggested. “If they make mistakes,
they should explain their actions” (Knoth 1987, 242). Yet patronage expanded
in the engineering-custodian category. In a development that began under Mayor
Thompson, these expenditures grew from 9.7 percent of teachers salaries in
1927 to 18.5 percent in 1947 (Peterson 1985, 182). Teachers bore the brunt of
Kelly’s economy measures, but janitors were spared.
After their deepest round of budget cuts, Kelly and McCahey quickly
brought the schools more fully under machine control than Thompson was
ever able to do; challenges to machine control of the schools were not mounted
again until the end of World War II. In the fall of 1933, police prevented
public school students from leaving the buildings to protest the economy
measures, but the board excused students for Kelly’s “A Century of Progress”
fair and his “Chicago Day” celebration. Kelly enthusiastically embraced the
New Deal and used Roosevelt’s coattails to maintain support in spite of the
cutbacks: “Save Our Schools and Support Our President,” read one petition.
In an effort to better control patronage in the face of stagnant or declining
tax receipts, the board began ruling on every instance of building repairs.6
By the 1939 election, Kelly arranged to attend 23 “Civic Celebrations” in
the public high schools, and the board loaned Kelly school employees to work
full-time on his campaign. In 1936 board members installed William Johnson
as superintendent; he was dogged by accusations of corruption throughout
his tenure (Herrick 1971, 247).7
With Kelly’s emphatic link to Roosevelt came federally funded patronage
jobs in the schools. The federal programs also helped bring about a decisive
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shift in African American voting patterns in Chicago, from the party of Lincoln
to the party of the New Deal (Weiss 1983). Kelly worked actively to bring
Black Chicago into the machine, partly through his school policies. The
McCahey board built a new high school in the South Side Black Belt and
remodeled another one in the mid-1930s (Homel 1984). Kelly also opposed
racial segregation in the schools, and his opposition was not merely symbolic.
For example, he ordered the board to reverse an edict that effectively seg-
regated high school students in Morgan Park, and “he used his police to
protect Black students and arrest hostile White demonstrators in the ensuing
furor” (Hirsh 1990, 67). Organized labor joined with business interests in
Kelly’s governing coalition. Following the Thompson pattern, but this time
with federal dollars augmenting state and local funds, school construction
represented a sizable chunk of depression-era projects. With generous pa-
tronage provisions for public school workers in the skilled trades and in the
custodian ranks, organized labor increasingly supported the machine in school
affairs, but during Kelly’s reign, the alliance between teachers and labor de-
teriorated. For example, the labor representative on Kelly’s school board voted
to approve the economy measures of 1933 that threw some “some 1,400
teachers” out of work (Peterson 1985, 179).
Machine control of the schools suffered a setback in the period 1945–47,
however. The National Education Association (NEA), upon the request of Chi-
cago teachers and principals, released a report critical of a school board that
reached far down in the public school bureaucracy to demote and transfer
teachers and principals, put excessive amounts of money into plant maintenance
and non-education-related services, and paid large sums to dummy corporations
under board members’ control.8 Soon after, the North Central Associations of
Colleges and Secondary Schools, responding to the NEA investigation and
pressure from Chicago’s Citizens Schools Committee and other middle-class
organizations, threatened to withdraw accreditation from Chicago’s public high
schools unless executive functions passed from an independent school board to
the superintendent (Herrick 1971, 273). As a further rebuff, the NEA also
expelled Superintendent Johnson. Kelly defended the board, threatening a law-
suit against the NEA, claiming that the allegations of corruption were nothing
more than a “political conspiracy stemming from the state university.”9 Perhaps
this response might have worked during the Depression, when there were more
pressing political issues than school board corruption, but in the rising economic
tide of the postwar 1940s, Kelly could not defuse the scandal. The mayor soon
bowed to pressure from a blue ribbon education committee he appointed,
chaired by Henry Heald of the Illinois Institute of Technology, and established
a school board nominating commission, which in turn slated new board mem-
bers. Meanwhile, the state legislature, in 1947, created a general superintendent
of education with control over business and legal departments.
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Both developments—the nominating commission and the general super-
intendent—gave the appearance of public school governance detached from
mayoral interference. The schools were now in the hands of an expert pro-
fessional administrator who answered to a board of education composed of
a cross section of business, labor, and middle-class representatives. But at the
same time the machine retained control of the public schools through mayoral
appointments to the nominating commission and a still-thriving network of
patronage appointments in the nonteaching positions (Shipps 2004). Mayor
Kelly did not stick around to preside over this merger of professional and
patronage control: the machine, headed by a new party chair, Jacob Arvey,
did not endorse Kelly for mayor in 1947, and so he withdrew from politics.
Board President McCahey, whom Kelly refused to axe, followed the mayor
into retirement.
Kelly’s support for racial desegregation in the schools contributed as much
to the machine’s decision to dump Kelly as the hue and cry of professional
educators and good government groups about corruption. An expanding post-
war color line that pushed into formerly White districts triggered anti-Black
violence in several neighborhoods, and this, together with Republican gains
in 1946, concerned the machine leadership. Kelly had established a Com-
mission on Human Relations in 1943, used police to break up protests by
White students when Blacks sought admission to three segregated White high
schools in 1945, and appointed Blacks to the board of education and to other
important posts in city government (Biles 1984; Hirsch 1990). But Kelly op-
erated within a machine that pursued a policy of racial containment coupled
with limited patronage for Black aspirants rather than supporting racial de-
segregation. According to historian Michael Homel, educational leaders had
used bureaucratic means to institute “informal” segregative policies in CPS
in the 1920s and 1930s (1984, 28). Kelly’s support for open housing and open
access to public schools put him out of step with the rest of the party hierarchy.
Nevertheless, Kelly looked to the schools principally as sources of patronage.
As with the Thompson years, mayoral control did not encompass questions
of educational quality or student achievement. Although the Great Migration
and rising school enrollments began to challenge Chicago’s color line, the
Democratic machine shored it up by ousting Kelly, and mayoral equilibrium
in school politics was restored.
Richard J. Daley: Machine Boss
The machine slated another Irish American for mayor in 1947, the unassum-
ing businessman Martin Kennelly. He had participated marginally in several
“good government” reform groups over the years, making him an ideal reform
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candidate for a party that sought to distance itself from the school scandal
(Herrick 1971). Kennelly ran on a social efficiency platform, pledging “that
the schools would be operated on a non-partisan, non-political basis.”10 Also
in 1947, the new board brought in Herold Hunt from Kansas City to assume
the post of general superintendent. Hunt received pressure from the Black
community to relieve overcrowding in South Side schools on a nonsegregated
basis, but the board did not support his efforts to build better race relations
in the public schools (Kamin 1970).11 When Hunt moved to the Harvard
Graduate School of Education in 1953, the board replaced him with Benjamin
Willis, an outsider who had been school superintendent in Buffalo, New York,
which had experienced similar racial friction in the postwar decade (Wolcott
2006). Meanwhile, an ambitious ward committeeman and county clerk, Rich-
ard J. Daley, became Democratic Party chair, and Kennelly’s reformist po-
sitions did not endear him to the new boss (Peterson 1976). Daley’s machine
subordinates dumped Kennelly and slated their leader to run for mayor in
the 1955 election. Once elected, Daley moved quickly to gut Kennelly’s civil
service reforms and expand patronage hires throughout Chicago, including
the schools.
In spite of a growing public workforce loyal to the mayor, Daley projected
his power on both sides of the ward politics versus professional expertise divide.
In Daley’s employment regime, a good government management style held
together teachers and other patronage workers even as it contained demands
from the civil rights movement. Daley was steeped in the partisan political
world of rewarding friends and punishing enemies, where elections were won
and lost, but he was also at home in the arcane world of budgets and planning,
where corporate Chicago thrived. Referring to Kennelly during the 1955
campaign, candidate Daley told an audience of 5,000 Democratic Party work-
ers: “My opponent says ‘I took politics out of the schools; I took politics out
of this and I took politics out of that.’ I say to you: There’s nothing wrong
with politics. There’s nothing wrong with good politics. Good politics is good
government” (Cohen and Taylor 2000, 120).12 Yet, speaking during the same
campaign to the middle-class education reform group, the Citizens Schools
Committee, Daley informed them that “partisan politics has no place in the
school system.”13
Chicago’s business elites, always potential education reformers on fiscal and
human capital grounds, soon shared Daley’s ambiguous “good politics” and
“no political interference” sentiments and supported him in all of his subse-
quent reelections. Part of the reason for this business support was due to
Daley’s highly visible downtown public works projects, an echo of Thompson.
But Daley also supported construction projects in the neighborhoods—in the
form of new school buildings for the baby boom generation. “Chicago needs
. . . adequate school facilities,” and 153 schools should “be torn down and
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replaced as soon as possible,” declared candidate Daley in 1955. His enthu-
siastic support for school construction convinced Chicago voters to approve
bond issues in the 1950s and early 1960s, and Daley liked to remind audiences
that, as mayor, he appointed the board responsible for the massive school
building program.14 Superintendent Ben Willis achieved his Thompsonesque
moniker, “Big Ben the Builder,” in no small part through Daley’s sponsorship
of local and state revenue for the public schools (Wneck 1988).15 Chicago’s
school-building programs intersected the professionalism/patronage divide
nicely: middle-class groups could laud Daley for his efficiency in addressing
obvious public needs, and the selection of real estate and distribution of con-
tracts enabled the machine to reward supporters in the Democratic Party and
in the business community.16
Despite the school-building program, in education it was racial politics that
became the overriding focus of Daley’s mayoralty. With the civil rights move-
ment, education took on new significance, but here Daley chose to cast the
issue of African American school access and quality as an administrative rather
than a political concern. Superficially, Daley and Willis’s school-building pro-
gram conformed to the machine pattern of rewarding constituencies. African
American voters on the South and West Sides were decisive to Daley’s electoral
victories, and, correspondingly, more new schools were built in these parts of
the city in the 1950s and early 1960s than anywhere else (Rury 1999). However,
the school-building program also functioned to contain African Americans in
those regions of the city in that the board erected schools within the densely
populated ghettos instead of locating them in border areas that were accessible
to all. When coupled with the locations of Daley’s more gargantuan public
works projects funded largely through the federal government—expressways,
high-rise public housing, the state university—the Democratic machine moved
decisively to create Chicago’s “second ghetto” (Hirsch 1983).
Daley’s 1955 campaign statement that “partisan politics has no place in
such matters as student transfers, location of new schools, or school boundary
lines” is particularly telling, for these were the policies upon which enforcement
of the color line in public education hinged.17 And on this issue Daley and
Superintendent Willis spoke the same language, because, in Willis’s view, the
educational leadership should be unswayed by “public opinion,” since the
neighborhood school best “emphasize[d] the role of the school in community
life” (Rury 1999, 126). Following the Brown decisions of 1954 and 1955, neither
the mayor nor the board nor the superintendent took integrationist public
stands for Chicago. As part of its growing assertiveness over civil rights in the
schools, the Chicago chapter of the NAACP presented formal student deseg-
regation proposals to the board in 1957 (Rich 1958).18 The machine retaliated
by stacking the branch membership, which voted to replace the NAACP’s
activist president, Willoughby Abner, with someone more pliable (Cohen and
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Taylor 2000). For his part, Willis argued that “he could not be held re-
sponsible” for segregation since his administration gathered no data on the
racial composition of the schools (Anderson and Pickering 1986, 77). Daley’s
social efficiency rhetoric continued in 1963 in the face of withering civil rights
opposition. “There should be no interference of any kind with the policies
and administration of the board of education,” Daley stated (Peterson 1976,
83). His board refused Willis’s resignation in 1963 and voted to extend his
contract in 1965. The autocratic superintendent was a veritable lightning rod
for both civil rights and backlash protests, and this, for a time, kept pressure
off Daley.19 The mayor even turned into a virtue Willis’s policy of erecting
portable classrooms and placing Black students in vacant commercial build-
ings. “All of us can take pride that [in] Chicago . . . not a single student is
on a double shift in a public school,” he boasted.20
Such statements reassured many White voters that Daley would defend the
racial composition of the public schools their children attended. Viewed
through the lens of the White electorate, since the neighborhood schools policy
provided seats to every student, Black protest was unreasonable. The school
board hired Midwesterner James Redmond to replace Willis in 1966. As
superintendent in New Orleans, Redmond had kept a low profile during the
school desegregation crisis of 1960, steering carefully between federal court
orders and school board directives (Fairclough 1995). During his Chicago
tenure, Redmond scaled back his modest desegregation plan in accordance
with the wishes of the school board majority. “I guess I’m old-fashioned,”
mused Daley in response to Redmond’s initial proposal. “It used to be that
people wanted to see their children home for lunch” (Peterson 1976, 161).
As assessed by several students of Chicago politics, Daley’s education strat-
egy—tacit segregation and either social efficiency rhetoric or silence when
pressed by civil rights activists—was shrewd for two reasons: his vocal support
for racial segregation would be unpopular in Black Chicago, where Daley
needed a degree of electoral support, but policies of racial integration would
lose him White votes. The mayor rose to the top of a political machine in
which the potential to divide into factions based on ethnicity was ever present;
dignified support for neighborhood schools helped forge White Chicagoans
of various ethnicities into supporters of Daley’s machine.
By the mid-1960s, however, urban protest forced Daley to display his power
more openly. He was no longer able to blunt civil rights demands with appeals
to efficient management. In 1965 Daley used his influence with President
Johnson to reverse a decision by the U.S. Office of Education to freeze $30
million in federal aid earmarked to Chicago under the newly passed Ele-
mentary and Secondary Education Act. Commissioner Francis Keppel cut off
funds after Willis refused to supply enrollment data to federal officials following
up on a complaint by Chicago’s citywide civil rights coalition (Cohen and
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Taylor 2000; Kleppner 1985). When the school board nominating commission
overstepped Daley’s bounds in 1968 by publicly recommending a new school
board president and the nonreappointment of two desegregation opponents,
Daley simply ignored the recommendations (Peterson 1976).
But the most legendary display of Daley’s power was in his confrontation
with Martin Luther King Jr. and the Chicago Freedom Movement in 1966.
Since the early 1960s, a civil rights coalition of religious and civic groups had
been working for better conditions in public schools on the South and West
Sides and had been seeking an end to the color line in school attendance
zones and transfer policies. What had begun as spontaneous local protests of
overcrowded schools turned into citywide student boycotts as well as dem-
onstrations at City Hall and in Daley’s home neighborhood of Bridgeport
(Anderson and Pickering 1986; Danns 2003). It was at this point that the
Chicago Freedom Movement invited King to Chicago, where demonstrators
greeted King’s nonviolent marches into White neighborhoods with rock throw-
ing, overturned cars, and other mayhem. Even though King and the civil
rights movement relied on nonviolent marches and moral appeals, Daley
wanted King out of Chicago because of the threat his movement posed to
electoral support in White and Black wards. He presented King with superficial
concessions while moving behind the scenes to limit protest. Daley obtained
an injunction to prevent the Chicago Freedom Movement from marching,
while telling King at negotiations that “we want to try to do what you say”
(McKnight 1989, 130). Daley referred repeatedly to programs that the city
was already undertaking: “I am not proud of the slums. No one is. We will
expand our programs” (Anderson and Pickering 1986, 208). While “Daley
thoroughly outfoxed King,” nevertheless, from the summer of 1966 onward
machine domination in the Black wards waned (Grimshaw 1987, 190).
Unlike Mayor Kelly, who excluded organized teachers, Daley found a way
to bring them into machine orbit in spite of their relative imperviousness to
patronage. In response to Depression-era cutbacks, most of Chicago’s public
school teacher organizations had consolidated into the Chicago Teachers Un-
ion (CTU) in 1937. Organized labor aligned with the Democratic machine
during the Depression, but it did not bring the teachers with them. This
changed with Daley, in spite of his stated opposition to public sector unions.
Daley forced his school board to recognize the CTU for collective bargaining
beginning in 1966, over Willis’s objections (Kyle and Kantowicz 1992, 30).
Daley’s empowerment of the CTU headed off the electoral threat that the
powerful teachers union posed, with its professional membership, to large-
scale patronage in other public school divisions (Shipps 2006, 62–63). More-
over, Daley’s reassertion of mayoral authority over the teachers union replaced,
to a degree, the machine’s eroded voting strength in the South Side and West
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Side wards (Grimshaw 1979). From 1969 to the end of Daley’s reign, teacher
strikes were a biennial occurrence, with the mayor influencing the board to
settle the strikes in the CTU’s favor. Rising teacher militancy of the 1960s
was contained, messily, within the bounds of a political machine that Daley
controlled. As one example of the machine’s tenuous hold on the CTU, when
the school board nominating commission advised dumping the two Daley
allies in 1968, CTU President John Desmond backed the mayor, but he also
led his teachers on a two-day walk-out the next year (Peterson 1976, 99).21
For its part, the CTU repaired some of its racial division by acceding to the
demands of Black teachers to end the practice of assigning African Americans
to poorly paid long-term substitute positions (Shipps 2006).
The mid-1960s brought Daley’s politics of educational growth to a close.
Chicago voters no longer passed additional tax levies: this, along with declining
state revenue, expensive labor settlements, and a lack of business confidence
in municipal Chicago following Daley’s death, emboldened financial institu-
tions to call in their school loans. The public schools verged on default in
1979 as 48,600 employees experienced their first “payless” payday since the
Depression (Kyle and Kantowicz 1992, 33). Relatedly, and despite the Daley
board’s efforts to stabilize racial turnover by promoting neighborhood schools,
much of White Chicago abandoned the public school system anyway—the
proportion of White enrollment fell from 62 percent to 19 percent over the
period 1950–1980, and this occurred in the absence of any citywide transfers
of students for desegregation. Black enrollment rose from 36 percent to 61
percent in the same time period (Kleppner 1985, 55).
By the 1970s, big city school systems across the United States had lost most
of their middle-class enrollments to the suburbs and had become increasingly
dependent on state and federal aid for their support (Kantor and Brenzel
1993; Mirel 1993). Daley was unwilling, and perhaps unable, to use his con-
siderable power to lead school levy drives and bond issues in the 1970s, and
his influence at the state level also began to erode. Given the similar predic-
ament of other big city school systems in the postwar era, it is likely that
structural changes in the national economy and the redistribution of urban
and suburban power had as much to do with the changes in public education
in Chicago as the machinations of Richard J. Daley. Nevertheless, he, like
many other big city mayors, cast his lot with a rearguard action of maintaining
racially segregated city schools rather than risking his position as mayor and
machine boss. “To maintain power,” as historian John Rury notes, “the . . .
machine had to uphold the existing spatial distribution of status and privilege
in the city. . . . In the end the mayor did not care enough to try and save
the city’s schools. They too were expendable if that was the price of power”
(Rury 1999, 135).
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Harold Washington: Anti-machine Reformer
Harold Washington approached the schools as an anti-machine reformer who
also sought to protect African American gains in school system governance
and employment. Washington’s mayoralty can be termed an empowerment
regime in that mayoral control included groups that employment regimes had
pushed to the margins. He governed during an era when corporate Chicago
joined middle-class school reform organizations and civil rights leaders in
calling for improvements in academic achievement and school quality. Wash-
ington was elected Chicago’s first African American mayor in 1983 on an
anti-machine platform—in the absence of Daley’s control, divisions in the
machine made it vulnerable to Washington’s grassroots insurgency. His cam-
paign united Black Chicago and was reminiscent of earlier civil rights and
Black Power social movements that swept Chicago in the mid-1960s. Indeed,
Washington named his 1983 campaign the “Chicago Political Freedom Move-
ment” (Carl 2001, 328). He also generated significant support in the growing
Latino wards, along with small numbers of liberal and leftist Whites. His
election was racially charged and bitterly contested; nevertheless, Washington
campaigned in all 50 wards to defeat Daley’s son and incumbent Mayor Jane
Byrne in the primary and then hung on to defeat a suddenly viable White
Republican candidate, Bernard Epton, in the general election (Alkalimat and
Gills 1989; Kleppner 1985). His victory promised access to City Hall for grass
roots community and civil rights organizations that the machine had excluded
during and immediately following the Daley years. Washington’s mayoralty,
however, also coincided with reduced federal aid to big cities (Kusmer 1996)
as well as resistance from City Council.
During his first term, Washington approached school reform cautiously. On
the one hand, the working-class parents who voted for him and community
activists who supported him had high expectations for better schools. They
had been closed out of school decision making by both the machine and public
school professionals, and now they expected influence. On the other hand,
many of the school professionals who supported Washington were African
Americans. Moreover, in the early 1980s there were several conservative re-
form proposals to modify school governance by reducing the size of the ad-
ministration or dividing the system into smaller districts. Not only were such
reforms opposed by the administrators, teachers, and central office staffers
who elected him but also they forced Washington into a defensive posture
regarding the public schools (Carl 2001). Although Washington had made the
public schools a campaign issue, he did not forcefully move to reform them
during his first term.
During the 1983 campaign, Washington neither argued for desegregation
(a position “20 years too late”) nor made the reversal of urban school decline
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a defining issue.22 Like his predecessors, Washington used the social efficiency
rhetoric of schools managed by professionals and insulated from partisan
politics. He stressed that political interference from Mayors Daley and Byrne
generated mismanagement and wreaked havoc on public school budgets. Just
like Daley, however, Washington pledged to bring more money into the system,
this time by fighting for an increase in the state income tax and lobbying for
other state and federal revenue, since the schools had operated in the red for
several years. “Our school system is not $100 million short next year as we
believed during the campaign,” stated Washington at his inauguration. “We
now find that the income may be $200 million less than the expenditures of
that vast bureaucracy.”23 Washington also made the board of education more
representative of the Chicago population and the public school student body
by appointing grass roots activists to the school board nominating commission
to replace some of the corporate and civic elites.24
During Washington’s first term, there was, however, the question of the
superintendency. In 1981, during Mayor Byrne’s term, the school board ap-
pointed outsider Ruth Love, from Oakland California, as Chicago’s first Af-
rican American superintendent. Her board excluded most input from Black
Chicago when it appointed Love, which marked the second time that Deputy
Superintendent Manford Byrd Jr., the highest-ranking African American ad-
ministrator in the district, had been passed over for the post. While Byrd only
had tepid support in the Black community and in the Washington adminis-
tration, Love backed Mayor Byrne during the 1983 election, when upward
of 80 percent of African American voters cast ballots for Washington in the
primary and fewer than 15 percent voted for the incumbent. This probably
sealed Love’s fate: when her contract was up for renewal in 1985, Washington
did not protect her from school board opponents that Byrd had lined up. In
spite of Washington’s backing, though, Superintendent Byrd maintained a
stronger allegiance to the school district bureaucracy than he did to the mayor.
During Washington’s second term, the mayor faced a school superintendent,
Byrd, whose first priority was protecting the status quo in the Chicago Public
Schools rather than working in the interest of the mayor’s office (Carl 2001,
331).25
Washington’s major school reform initiatives occurred in 1986 and 1987. He
created his first “Education Summit” in 1986 in response to citywide concerns
over high dropout and unemployment rates of public school–educated youth.
In the envisaged business-school compact, corporate Chicago would guarantee
jobs to high school graduates in exchange for school district guarantees of
improved academic achievement (Mayor’s Education Summit 1988).26 This
summit was intended, in part, as a goodwill gesture to the business com-
munity—Washington had been elected without their backing. Moreover, the
abolition of the School Finance Authority, which corporate Chicago had made
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a stipulation in the 1979 financial bailout of the schools, was one of Wash-
ington’s 1983 campaign planks. He had also promised to extend city dollars
beyond the loop and other gentrifying areas to neighborhoods that had been
starved for city services during the machine years (Alkalimat and Gills 1989),
and his efforts to redistribute city contracts, following his 1986 consolidation
of power in the City Council, also made business leaders uneasy.
After a year of negotiations, however, negotiations for a business–public
school compact broke down. Neither school nor business leadership was willing
to compromise. The corporate umbrella group offered to hire 1,000 graduates
beginning in 1988. In exchange, it wanted the district to raise achievement
levels and reduce the dropout rate to the national averages.27 Superintendent
Byrd wanted the improvements on achievement and dropout rates to be targets
rather than guarantees. Moreover, the Chicago Public Schools sought a pledge
of 6,000 graduates hired yearly by Chicago corporations and wanted the
business coalition to bring another $52 million to the schools. Business leaders
were “appalled” at the superintendent’s “stipulations and attempts to make
the business community responsible for providing resources,” and they threat-
ened to use their influence to force the board to meet their educational de-
mands and time frame (Carl 2001, 333). The Washington administration, for
its part, believed business leaders should help raise additional funds and viewed
their offer of 1,000 jobs to graduates as insufficient. As to the school district’s
response, Washington staffers believed that the school system should provide
specific achievement and graduation plans, including reallocation of resources,
prior to demanding so many hires from the private sector.28
Meanwhile, the CTU and the board could not agree on an austerity contract
in the wake of state reductions in revenue, so the teachers embarked on a
strike that lasted the first four weeks of the 1987 school year, capping a period
of labor unrest in the schools that had grown since the end of Daley’s reign.
The CTU had endorsed incumbent Mayor Byrne during Washington’s 1983
campaign but endorsed Washington four years later.29 Unlike Daley, Wash-
ington lacked the connections with Chicago’s financial community to negotiate
a quick settlement based on increased borrowing, but Washington was also
unwilling to sacrifice teachers’ jobs in the face of budget woes, as Mayor Kelly
had done 50 years earlier. The 1987 strike triggered manifold calls for com-
prehensive education reform by all the major players with a stake in the public
schools—the mayor, business groups, middle-class and foundation-supported
school reform advocacy groups, African American and Latino civil rights
organizations, and grassroots activists (Kyle and Kantowicz 1992). For his
part, as Washington brought the contract negotiation teams to his office for
a settlement, he signaled support to the Black and working-class wing of his
electoral coalition with sharpened criticism of the schools. “The public schools
are terrible,” he said. “You may have heard that they were good in the good
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old days. Don’t you believe it. They were worse. They were worse for the
Black and poor communities than they are today. The difference today is that
the school population is ninety percent Black and poor so the whole system
is disrespected the way only a few of us were disrespected before” (Untitled
1987, 5).30
Washington’s strategy was to channel widespread opposition to the strike
into an expanded summit. He convinced the discredited board of education
and the CTU to attend as part of their agreement to end the strike. He also
added middle-class school reform groups and civic notables to the business
leaders already at the summit. Finally, he created a coalition of public school
parents and grassroots activists from throughout the city, dubbed the Parent/
Community Council, and installed them at the summit. In Washington’s
scheme, it was the Parent/Community Council and the business coalition that
had the most votes in the summit negotiations. Washington also directed the
Chicago Democratic delegation in Springfield to block the myriad solutions
that legislators had in store for Chicago until the summit could draft its own
bill. The mayor seemed on the way to brokering a school reform agreement
among nongovernmental groups, especially between the unlikely combination
of business elites and multiracial activists at the level of school and neigh-
borhood. The reform was to feature elected councils at each Chicago school
with some authority over budget and personnel (Carl 2001). Washington had
been familiar with the concept of local school councils since his first citywide
campaign in 1977;31 the creation of this grass roots political structure in the
schools could serve as a counterweight to a political machine that was teetering
in 1987 but that still had one of Daley’s sons waiting in the wings.
The summit unraveled almost immediately upon Washington’s death in
November of 1987. Instead, a business-led coalition gained the upper hand
in Springfield and ensured that a School Finance Authority with expanded
powers maintained ultimate budgetary power in the schools. At the school
level, the 1988 Act also redistributed state aid in proportion to the poverty
level of each school, with the expectation that the schools reduce the size of
the central administration. The school reform legislation that passed the next
year decentralized the system—it featured local school councils that gave
parents and residents a formal mechanism of input in each of Chicago’s public
schools. It also moved toward an elective board, with the creation of a new
school board nominating commission, the majority of whose members were
elected from the ranks of the local school councils (Carl 1995; State of Illinois
1989). The mayor appointed an additional five members to the nominating
commission and selected school board members from three-person slates cre-
ated by the commission. It is unlikely that Washington would have conceded
his authority to appoint school board members had he lived. More than this,
however, Washington’s death may have precluded the reform legislation from
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addressing other educational issues of importance to Chicago public school
students, particularly the link between urban schools and skilled labor markets
and the need for greater fiscal support for classroom services. These are needs
that governance reforms alone cannot address.
Conclusion
Mayoral authority to appoint members of the board of education over the
course of the twentieth century makes the Windy City something of a labo-
ratory of mayoral control. While Chicago mayors could not directly install
school superintendents until 1995, their school boards made appointments
that were in consonance with mayoral interests. Each of the mayors had a
hand in selecting school superintendents, and even though Daley did not
appoint Superintendent Willis himself, this holdover from the Kennelly regime
retained his position because his neighborhood school policies were in accord
with Daley’s objectives. When Daley’s death and civil service reforms unglued
the Democratic machine in the 1970s and 1980s and a reform mayor en-
couraged grass-roots community groups and middle-class school reformers to
step into the breach vacated by a discredited school administration and teach-
ers union, the school system moved toward decentralized control (Bennett
1989). By 1995, however, mayoral control of the public schools was recon-
solidated at the behest of the state legislature through the rekindling of the
historically cozy relationship between the mayor’s office and corporate Chi-
cago (Shipps 2006).
The record of mayoral politics in Chicago’s public schooling prior to the
1995 Chicago School Reform Act does not bode well for mayoral control as
a strategy that will improve urban schools across the board. Rather, the evi-
dence presented here shows four mayors using the schools to put together
coalitions that met their own political interests; with one possible exception,
these political interests did not necessarily coincide with higher-quality urban
schools. All of the mayors embraced educational positions that were as much
about marshaling votes and winning the support of corporate Chicago as they
were about improving the schools. As leaders of political machines, the first
three mayors also used the schools as important patronage sites. While the
political interests of the fourth mayor, Washington, coincided with the edu-
cational aspirations of public school parents, the majority of whom were Black
and Latino and working class, his educational policies lacked staying power—
without the machine, he depended on personal appeal for his mass mobili-
zations of voters, and business elites remained aloof to his administration and
to the social movement that elected him.
William Thompson used the populist rhetoric of an inclusive curriculum
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to shore up electoral support while using his school boards as sites of patronage
that rewarded his machine functionaries and business backers. The tempest
he created in his critique of the curriculum enabled “Big Bill” to attract White
Catholic votes even as he maintained Black support for the party of Lincoln
and excluded organized labor from his governing coalition. Educational access
to secondary education grew at a fast clip in the 1920s, with some of the
increase due to the policies of the superintendent hired by reform Mayor
Dever’s board, William McAndrew (Peterson 1985). Whereas teacher salaries
increased through the 1920s, patronage was rampant and the improved stan-
dard of living of teachers was as much an electoral consideration as an ed-
ucational one. The growth of secondary education in Chicago after World
War I had many causes, but leadership from the mayor’s office was not one
of them. Patronage and populism were the keys to Thompson’s education
policies, not improved educational access and quality. Edward Kelly’s machine
exploited the schools much like Thompson did, as a rich site of patronage for
a political machine centered on White Catholic Chicago. The civic nationalism
of the New Deal supplanted Thompson’s demagogic rhetoric of America First
and drew Black Chicago to his electoral coalition (Weiss 1983). Whereas
Thompson rewarded both teachers and custodians, Kelly sacrificed teachers
in the belt-tightening of the Great Depression and separated them from or-
ganized labor. But what started out as a boon to Black students—a mayor
who exchanged tangible benefits for Black votes, couched within the civic
nationalism of the New Deal—ended with a reassertion of racial nationalism
in the local Democratic Party as the patronage scandals of the late 1940s put
Kelly and his school board president into retirement.32
In light of the Thompson and Kelly records, it was more difficult for sub-
sequent mayors to flagrantly exploit the schools. It forced them to emphasize
professionalism and reform as well as patronage and spoils, but under the
guidance of Mayor Richard J. Daley, professionalism went no deeper than an
electoral strategy to maintain power. As machine boss, Daley combined the
characteristics of the expert disinterested manager with those of the political
chieftain. Encapsulated in “The City That Works” slogan, machine control
in the Windy City shed much of its inefficient image under Daley even as
patronage hires and contracts flourished in the burgeoning postwar economy.
Daley was also the leader of the backlash against Black political power in
education in the 1950s and 1960s. Declining support in the Black wards was
offset, in part, by winning over organized teachers to the machine through
his granting of collective bargaining rights. Electorally, Daley’s return to a
hands-off position regarding the schools seemed to pay off in the 1970s: as
more of White Chicago abandoned the public schools, White voters did not
punish Daley for the perceived decline in public education. Although Daley
discovered that education was of vital importance to the civil rights movement,
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he fought a rearguard action instead of acceding to demands for greater access
and better quality in the schools. Washington approached the schools as a
reformer who represented a Black constituency devoid of political machine
or big business support. Washington’s relationship with the public schools was
tentative initially due to a class divide in his electoral coalition between work-
ing-class parents of public school students and middle-class educators who
worked in the public system. But a management/labor crisis in the schools,
together with a crescendo of demands for better quality in an educational
sense from business, middle-class reformers, and the grass roots, propelled
Washington to lead school reform efforts, making him the first mayor since
Harrison to make school improvement a conspicuous part of his agenda. The
current mayor, Richard M. Daley, has continued this reform trend with the
authority that the legislature vested in him.
Read one way, this narrative could be understood as a “Whig” history of
mayoral control, with the blatant patronage and corruption of Thompson and
Kelly giving way to the hybrid professional/patronage control of Daley and
the reform control of Washington.33 The 1995 Chicago School Reform Act
and Richard M. Daley’s management of a school reform regime is the cul-
mination of this rosy tale of progress. There is danger in viewing contemporary
mayoral regimes as perfections of past mayoral politics marked by populism,
patronage, and self-interest, but observers of contemporary urban politics
sometimes make this leap. For example, it has been asserted recently that
greater mayoral control is beneficial because contemporary mayors are on
the cutting edge of a “New Political Culture” in which rational improvements
of city services trump narrower political considerations (Wong 2006, 172).
Over the past decade some urban regimes have been characterized by en-
lightened and rational management that transcends party politics according
to this outlook. The integrated governance that mayoral control fosters, ac-
cording to Kenneth Wong and his colleagues, “can lead to improvements in
student achievement and management efficiency” (Wong et al. 2007, 198).
Historical evidence from Chicago shows that there is good reason to question
this progressive view of mayoral control.
A look at Chicago’s mayors shows that political interests in education frac-
tured along the lines of race, class, and culture in the twentieth century. Mayors
considered cultural differences of religion, language, and immigrant status in
their electoral strategies: Thompson courted the immigrant vote, Kelly and
Daley managed ethnic differences in their overwhelmingly Catholic political
base, and Washington wooed Latinos to his electoral and educational coalition
centered in the African American wards. Under Thompson, Kelly, and Daley,
working-class and middle-class Whites with machine affiliations, along with
business leadership, had better access to the decision-making pathways of the
school district, with Blacks benefiting less from their ties to the same political
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machines. Under Washington, working-class and middle-class Blacks and La-
tinos had new access to an emerging education agenda that they supported,
with Whites and business groups having less power to control the agenda.
To a certain degree, this article reinforces a perspective on the politics of
education that has been popularized by Kenneth Meier and his colleagues
over the years, in which they stress that school policies reflect the political
interests of those that control the schools. Meier cautions that representation
includes both the symbolic and the substantive, as appointed boards that are
“highly representative in terms of race and ethnicity” might not “share values
with the constituents they represent.” School districts meet the demands of
social groups—access, policy, curriculum, instruction—in relation to the po-
litical power that those groups wield, translated as representation on school
boards and in the administrative and teaching ranks. “To the extent that
mayoral control limits or cuts off one or more avenues of access to either the
agenda or policy makers,” according to Meier, “some groups are likely to
benefit from the process and others harmed” (Meier 2004, 225).34 Following
Meier’s linkage of political power to educational policy, then, school reformers
working to improve the educational experiences and achievement of minority
and working-class youth—the majority of students in urban school systems—
would do well to align themselves to political movements that elect mayors
with the same interests, rather than looking to increased mayoral control as
a stand-alone solution. In other words, which mayor is in office may matter
more for the majority of students than changing the governance structure to
give the mayor’s office more power in school affairs. However, mayoral ob-
jectives comprise more than school reform, and electorates consider more
than the condition of the schools when casting votes for mayors. Thompson
shrugged off school scandals in his return to the mayor’s office. Neither aus-
terity measures during the Depression nor deteriorating conditions for students
in the 1960s and 1970s changed the electoral outcome for Kelly and Daley.
Consolidation of power on the city council was the focus of Washington’s first
term, not school reform. Symbolic and substantive representation through the
mayor’s office does not necessarily translate into better schools.
In one way, however, there is still good reason to support the view that
contemporary mayors have greater motivation than earlier ones to care about
the quality of the public schools and to improve the academic achievement
of their students. At the risk of overstatement, this article also shows Chicago
mayors moving from using the schools as sites for building electoral constit-
uencies and distributing political spoils to viewing them as a bulwark of the
city economy. Mayors did not need social scientists to explain to them the
linkage between educational attainment and socioeconomic status that grew
across the twentieth century as secondary and university education expanded.
Thompson benefited from rising high school enrollments, Daley played an
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active role in bringing a University of Illinois campus to Chicago, and Wash-
ington folded business desires for better academic achievement into his school
reform coalition. The postindustrial economy—with its declining emphasis on
manufacturing and increasing emphasis on the service sector, with information
technology at the cutting edge—has generated an occupational structure in
which the academic skills that educational credentials represent take on height-
ened importance (Bills 2004). And with increasing globalization, in which
cities such as Chicago serve as command and control centers that link inter-
national capital, manufacturing, and services together, political and business
leaders necessarily take increased interest in preparing a highly educated urban
workforce that is attractive to global employers (Carnoy and Rhoten 2002;
Lipman 2004). But even with the human capital question in play, the postin-
dustrial economy generates unskilled jobs along with highly analytical ones.
Viewed this way, urban education systems need not raise all boats.
As far back as the 1899 Harper commission, Chicago mayors controlled
the schools as both efficient managers and astute politicos. But, more impor-
tantly, Chicago’s mayors did not or could not reduce the inequalities of race
and class that shaped the educational experiences of public school students.
Although it is beyond the scope of this article, there are strong indications
that Richard M. Daley’s resurgent mayoral activism in the schools since 1995
has done little to reverse educational inequalities in Chicago either—gaps
between public schools with middle-class and working-class clienteles may
have widened, and proposals of working-class and minority parents for better
schools have been sidelined (Lipman 2004; Shipps 2006).35 While it may be
the case that mayors, to a greater degree than other leaders, must be on board
to make citywide school improvements possible, there is little indication from
twentieth-century Chicago, a bastion of mayoral control in public education,
that stronger mayoral authority is the key to improving the schooling expe-
rienced by the majority of urban students.
Notes
The author would like to thank Karen Graves, John Rury, and the anonymous
reviewers for their helpful comments and suggestions on earlier versions of this article.
1. Some big cities bucked this trend. For example, in Baltimore the state reduced
mayoral authority.
2. “Inaugural Address of William Hale Thompson,” April 18, 1927, in Inaugural
Addresses of the Mayors of Chicago, 1840–1999, Municipal Reference Collection, Harold
Washington Library (Chicago Public Library), Chicago (herafter HWL).
3. To be sure, threatening Superintendent McAndrew and King George were not
the only reasons Thompson won. Charles Merriam, the University of Chicago political
scientist who was a member of the school board and a mayoral candidate himself in
the 1919 election, notes that Dever made the mistake of enforcing “the dry law,”
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whereas Thompson favored a Chicago “wetter than the Atlantic Ocean” (Merriam
1929, 190).
4. Indeed, one board member sought “to close each and every public school in the
City of Chicago immediately” (Chicago Board of Education 1933a, 1243).
5. Teachers poster, Citizens Schools Committee, July 1933–September 1933, scrap-
book 2, Citizens Schools Committee Papers, Chicago Historical Society, 1601 North
Clark Street, Chicago, IL (hereafter CHS). The Citizens School Committee was a
teacher-led civic group organized in response to depression-era cutbacks.
6. Citizens Save Our Schools Committee flyers, scrapbook 2, July 1933–September
1933, Citizens Schools Committee papers, CHS.
7. See also Chicago Daily News, April 21, 1938, in scrapbook 8 of Citizens Schools
Committee Papers, CHS.
8. Report of Executive Secretary to the Twelfth Annual Meeting of the Citizens
Schools Committee, February 14, 1946; National Education Association, “Certain
Personnel Practices in the Chicago Public Schools,” 1945. Both in Citizens Schools
Committee Papers, box 5, folder 5, CHS. See also the address by Donald Washane,
“The NEA Report in the Light of Recent Developments,” February 14, 1946, Citizens
Schools Committee Papers, box 5, folder 6, CHS.
9. Letter from John Lapp to Advisory Board of the Citizens Schools Committee,
December 3, 1946, Citizens Schools Committee Papers, box 6, folder 1, CHS.
10. Martin Kennelly speech to 1955 Citizens School Committee Annual Meeting,
March 16, 1955, Citizens School Committee Papers, box 13, folder 5, CHS.
11. Timuel Black interview with author, Chicago, January 13, 2000. Black was an
education and labor activist and a chronicler of South Side Chicago politics and culture.
He also helped lead Harold Washington’s mayoral campaigns.
12. “Good government is good politics” was a ubiquitous banner at Daley’s 1950s
and 1960s campaign rallies.
13. Richard J. Daley, “Address to Citizens’ Schools Committee Meeting, Eleventh
Street Theater,” March 16, 1955, Citizens’ Schools Committee Papers, box 13, folder
5, CHS.
14. Richard J. Daley, “Address to Citizens’ Schools Committee; Inaugural Address
of Richard J. Daley,” April 21, 1959, Inaugural Addresses of the Mayors of Chicago,
1840–1999, Municipal Reference Collection, HWL.
15. Willis carefully followed the directives of the board. Of course, on election days,
a majority of voters remembered who the real “builder” was.
16. It should be noted that, by all accounts, Daley himself did not benefit financially
from the huge construction projects that he organized. According to Mary Herrick,
for example, there “was not one rumor of scandal” in the Chicago Public Schools
building program that Willis directed (Herrick 1971, 309).
17. Richard J. Daley, “Address to Citizens’ Schools Committee Meeting,” March
16, 1955, Municipal Reference Collection, HWL..
18. Contrast this to the milder strategy of 1954, reminiscent of the Thompson days,
when the local branch complained of school textbooks “which contain hardly an
integrated scene” (NAACP Chicago Branch testimony at Chicago Public Schools Bud-
get hearing, December 28, 1954, Citizens Schools Committee Papers, box 13, folder
3, CHS).
19. For treatments of the desegregation controversy in the 1960s, see Anderson and
Pickering 1986; Biles 1995; Cohen and Taylor 2000; Kleppner 1985; Peterson 1976;
and Rury 1999.
20. “Inaugural Address of Richard J. Daley, April 17, 1963,” Inaugural Addresses of
the Mayors of Chicago, 1840–1999, Municipal Reference Collection, HWL.
Mayoral Control in Chicago
332 American Journal of Education
21. Chicago Teachers Union, “171 Years of Teaching in Chicago,” mimeographed,
n.d., 18, in author’s possession.
22. “The Washington Papers,” 1980, 57, State Senatorial Records, box 12, folder
13; “Background Information for Working Paper on Education,” 1982, 1–12, Mayoral
Campaign Records, box 42. Both are in Harold Washington Papers, HWL.
23. “Inaugural Address of Harold Washington,” April 29, 1983, Inaugural Addresses
of the Mayors of Chicago, 1840–1999, Municipal Reference Collection, HWL.
24. Citizen Nominating Committee for Board of Education, “Report for 1987 Nom-
inating Round,” 4, Education Subseries, box 30, folder 2, Harold Washington Papers,
HWL.
25. Timuel Black interview with author, Chicago, January 13, 2000.
26. Hal Baron interview with author, Chicago, January 13, 2000. Baron served as
Washington’s policy advisor.
27. “Chicago Partnership for Educational Progress Proposal to Chicago Board of
Education/Chicago Public Schools, July 9, 1987, Education Subseries, box 30, folder
19, Harold Washington Papers, HWL.
28. Chicago Public Schools, “Proposed revisions to Proposal by Chicago Partnership
for Educational Progress,” July 17, 1987, Education Subseries, box 30, folder 19; and
undated draft of Chicago’s preliminary response to Board of Education and Chicago
Partnership, Education Subseries, box 30, folder 19, both in Harold Washington Papers,
HWL.
29. Robert Healey telephone interview with author, January 3, 2000. Healey served
as CTU President from 1972 to 1984, before moving to president of the Chicago
Federation of Labor.
30. The quote is from a community magazine, Keep Strong, published by The Heart
of Uptown Coalition, which supported Washington and was active in White and
Hispanic neighborhoods on the North Side.
31. Harold Washington, “A Program to Get Chicago’s People Working,” 1977, and
“Program for a Working City,” 1977, both in State Senate Records, box 11, folder 3,
Harold Washington Papers, HWL.
32. On the tension between racial and civic nationalisms in the twentieth century,
see Gerstle (2001).
33. Herbert Butterfield stated in 1931 that Whig interpretations “emphasize certain
principles of progress in the past and . . . produce a story which is the ratification, if
not the glorification, of the present” (Novick 1988, 13).
34. See also Meier and Stewart 1991; and Meier, Stewart, and England 1989.
35. But this is contested. See also Wong 2007.
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